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FLOODING THE MISSOURI VALLEY
THE POLITICS OF DAM SITE SELECTION AND DESIGN

ROBERT KELLEY SCHNEIDERS

Dakota is 160 feet high and 10,700 feet long.
The reservoir behind it stretches 140 miles
north-northwest along the Missouri Valley.
Oahe Dam, near Pierre, South Dakota, surpasses even Fort Randall Dam at 242 feet high
and 9300 feet long.! Oahe's reservoir stretches
250 miles upstream. The completion of Garrison Dam in North Dakota, and Oahe, Big
Bend, Fort Randall, and Gavin's Point dams
in South Dakota resulted in the innundation
of nearly 700 miles of the Missouri Valley from
Yankton, South Dakota, to Williston, North
Dakota. 2
The inundation of such a vast stretch of the
Missouri River Valley caused tremendous
changes in the lifestyles of the people who
lived within or near the valley. Many European-American ranchers and farmers had to
relocate their families and reestablish agricultural enterprises in other areas. The residents
of Niobrara, Nebraska, and Pollock, South Dakota, moved their homes and businesses after
two Pick-Sloan dams flooded the towns.
Indians in the Dakotas and Nebraska were
affected by the inundation of their reservation lands-all of the Missouri Valley bottomlands located on the Crow Creek, Lower Brule,

In December 1944 the United States Congress passed a Rivers and Harbors Bill that
authorized the construction of the Pick-Sloan
plan for Missouri River development. From
1946 to 1966, the United States Army Corps
of Engineers, with the assistance of private
contractors, implemented much of that plan
in the Missouri River Valley. In that twentyyear period, five of the world's largest earthen
dams were built across the main-stem of the
Missouri River in North and South Dakota.
The size of these structures defies the imagination. Fort Randall Dam in southeast South

Robert Kelley Schneiders is an instructor of history at
Texas Tech University. His fields of specialization are
agricultural history and rural studies, emphasizing US
environmental history.
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Fio. 1. Indian reservations along the main-stem of the Missouri River in northeast Nebraska. South Dakota. and
North Dakota. Note the location of the reservations in relation to the Pick-Sloan dams and reservoirs. The Corps
of Engineers. in cooperation with political representatives from the Missouri Basin. designed and built the dams to
maximize reservoir water storage capacity while sparing major urban centers from inundation . Large reservoirs in
turn guaranteed the legislative success of the dam-building program. Author's adaptation of a map provided by
the Missouri River Division. US' Army Corps of Engineers. Omaha. Nebraska.

Cheyenne River Sioux, Standing Rock, and
Fort Berthold reservations. Indians on these
reservations, and on the Yankton, Rosebud,
and Santee reservations, lost a total of 353,313
acres for reservoir water storage. 3 In addition,
the Indian towns of Fort Thompson (Crow
Creek Reservation), Lower Brule (Lower Brule
Reservation), Cheyenne River Agency (Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation), and nine towns
on the Fort Berthold Reservation were inundated. Approximately 3538 Indians were
forced to relocate from the valley lands to the
uplands or to off-reservation towns. 4 Another
6900 Indians were affected in varying degrees
of severity.s
This article addresses a series of related
questions. First, why did the Indians lose so
much land and so many communities to the

reservoirs of the Pick-Sloan Plan? Were the
inundations of Indian land the inevitable result of a decision-making process that objectively chose the best sites for dams and
reservoirs on the Missouri River? Furthermore,
why were Pick-Sloan's Missouri River dams
and reservoirs designed and constructed at
locations that were so disadvantageous to Indian interests? Why were the reservoir water
storage levels behind each dam so high that
large Indian populations had to relocate above
the valley floor? In order to answer these questions, I begin with an examination of the origins of the Pick-Sloan Plan then detail the
various factors that determined the location
of Pick-Sloan's Missouri River dams. I conclude by arguing that the sites of the PickSloan Plan dams were chosen primarily for
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political reasons rather than because of geological or engineering considerations.
ORIGINS OF THE PICK-SLOAN PLAN

The Pick-Sloan Plan emerged out of the
efforts of individuals and organizations
throughout the Missouri River Basin who
sought river development. The most important of these was the Missouri River States
Committee, formed in the early 1940s to promote a comprehensive development scheme
for the Missouri River. Pick-Sloan was largely
the creation of the Missouri River States Committee, which brought together numerous interest groups that favored Missouri River
development and enabled them to coordinate
their efforts. The organization's power
stemmed from its ability to lobby the public
and Congress. 6
In the fifty years before 1940, small towns
and counties throughout the Dakotas had promoted small, localized river development
schemes. For instance, business and political
organizations in Mobridge, South Dakota, had
sought a dam on the Missouri River to their
west since the early 1920s. Mitchell, South
Dakota, boosters had wanted a hydroelectric
facility at the Big Bend of the Missouri since
the 1910s. And members of the Lower Brule
Tribe had lobbied the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Department of Interior for the
construction of a dam or power plant on reservation land at Big Bend in the 1930s. All of
these early promotional efforts came to naught,
as no one river project garnered enough statewide political or financial support, and such
federal officials as those in the Army Corps of
Engineers who viewed dams as a threat to navigation below Sioux City opposed Missouri
River development in the Dakotas prior to
the 1940s. 7
Beginning in the early forties, Missouri
River development efforts expanded. Major
cities and states within the Missouri River Basin began to organize to promote a program of
interstate or federal development of the river.
The states of the upper Missouri River Basin

(Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Wyoming) had endured a decade of drought
and hardship in the 1930s and viewed impounded Missouri River water as a resource
for averting future economic downturns and
agricultural disasters. These states hoped to
solve their economic problems, stop out-migration, and prevent the hardships that the
unpredictable weather patterns of the Great
Plains had had on their economies. 8
Upper Missouri River Basin residents hoped
to develop the Missouri River for irrigation,
hydroelectric power, and navigation. Aware
of the multiple economic problems in the Missouri River Basin, Clifford Stone of Colorado,
a lawyer and judge who had been instrumental
in water resource development in his home
state and who had organized an interstate coordinating committee to develop the Colorado River, advised the governors of the
Missouri Basin to meet and coordinate their
goals for river development. 9 Stone believed
that a unified basin lobbying group would be
effective in securing project funds from the
US Congress. lO
In December 1941, one week after the
bombing of Pearl Harbor and America's entry
into World War II, representatives from the
Bureau of Reclamation, Army Corps of Engineers, business interests in the upper basin, and
government representatives from the states of
South Dakota, North Dakota, Wyoming, Montana, and Nebraska met in Bismarck, North
Dakota, to discuss and coordinate their plans for
Missouri River development. This meeting resulted in the formation of the Missouri River
States Committee (MRSC). Over the next
several years, this committee became influential in pushing for a comprehensive, basinwide program for the Missouri River.l1
In July 1942 the MRSC held its first meeting in Billings, Montana, and agreed to seek
the participation of the other basin states in a
permanent organization. By 21 May 1943 the
MRSC had added Kansas, Missouri, and Iowa,
for a total of eight members.12 This broader
coalition of the Missouri River Basin's political and economic interests, however, did not
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FIG. 2. Merrill Q. Sharpe, c. 1942. Courtesy of
Missouri River Division, US Army Corps of
Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska.

represent the Indians living on reservations
adjacent to the Missouri Ri~er in Nebraska
and the Dakotas. According to Robert Hipple,
editor of the Pierre Capital Journal, a member
of the MRSC's successor Missouri Basin Interagency Committee, and a congressional lobbyist for Missouri River development, the fully
constituted MRSC did not have one Indian
representative. As a matter of fact, the MRSC
did not seek to include the Indians of the Missouri Valley within the organization.B On the
remote reservations of the upper Missouri
River, the Indian population had little or no
idea that plans and policies were being formulated that would dramatically affect their lives.
In 1943, the MRSC appointed South Dakota Governor Merrill Q. Sharpe (Fig. 2) as
the committee's chairperson. Sharpe was a
native of Kennebec, South Dakota, and had
been involved in Missouri River development
schemes since the early 1930s. 14 Governor
Sharpe would playa crucial role in the political compromises that created the Pick-Sloan

Plan. Under his direction the MRSC conducted a massive public relations drive
throughout the basin to garner public support
for dams, channelization works, and levees
along the Missouri River. Cities all along the
valley, including Williston, Bismarck, Pierre,
Chamberlain, Yankton, Sioux City, Omaha,
and Kansas City, hosted public forums during
1942, 1943, and 1944, but no forums were
ever held in any of the Indian communities
along the Missouri River.J5
Why were the Indians of the Dakotas not
represented on the MRSC and why were promotional meetings only held in off-reservation towns and cities? First, the Indian
population on the reservations could not afford the hydroelectricity and irrigation water
provided by any proposed project, so it did not
make sense to the MRSC members to visit the
reservations promoting products tribes could
not buy. Second, the members of the MRSC
conducted the meetings in the cities and towns
that would provide the tax revenue for project
construction. Since the reservation population could not contribute to financing the
project, they did not, from the committee's
point of view, need to be convinced of the
project's benefits. Finally, members of the
MRSC, and off-reservation population in general, believed Indian reservation lands were
underutilized. They believed that reservation
land was more beneficial to society at large
and the Indians themselves if it was used for
river control works than if it was left to the
management decisions of the Indian population and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 16
At the MRSC-sponsored public forums,
Army engineers and Bureau of Reclamation
field agents explained how the river would
actually be engineered to meet society's demands. Business people and politicians explained the economic benefits of harnessing
the water of the river. The public relations
strategy was successful. There was no organized off-reservation opposition within the
basin to controlling the Missouri River and
using its waters to stabilize and promote the
basin's economyY
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In the early forties opposition to a basinwide approach to controlling the Missouri
River arose over the specifics of river development, not development itself. In 1943 and
1944, interest groups haggled over the types
of dams and reservoirs to be built. Later in the
decade, as several dams of the Pick-Sloan Plan
neared completion, the debate centered on
what organizations or governmental entities
would administer the completed works. Different economic and political interests wanted
different aspects of the river development plan
stressed over others. 18
Farmers, business people, and politicians
from the upper basin (Montana, North Dakota,
South Dakota, and Wyoming) represented by
the National Reclamation Association, South
Dakota Reclamation Association, Montana
Stockgrowers Association and a number of
chambers of commerce wanted dams that met
their needs for irrigation and hydroelectric
power. Lower basin residents from Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska, led by the Kansas
City Chamber of Commerce, Mississippi Valley Association, and the National Rivers and
Harbors Congress, wanted a plan that protected their cities from devastating floods,
opened them to deep-draft barge traffic, and
provided them with cheap power. The goals
of the upper and lower basin did not coincide. If the upper basin irrigationists received
the water they wanted for their crops, commercial interests in the lower basin believed
they would have to abandon their navigation
channel. Both upper basin and lower basin
residents understood that water required to
sustain a six-foot or possibly nine-foot navigation channel from Sioux City to St. Louis for
eight months a year would lower the proposed
upstream reservoirs and siphon off water required for irrigation. No one in the MRSC
had an. immediate solution to this conflict of
interest. 19
Devastating floods in 1943 exacerbated the
debate over river development. Three successive floods from April through June ravaged
towns and farms throughout the valley.20
Omaha, Nebraska, and the bottomlands east

of Kansas City, Missouri, sustained heavy damage from the flood waters. The floods disrupted rail and river traffic along the Missouri
and Mississippi rivers during the wartime emergency. High water also caused damage in lower
Mississippi River states. The floods gave urgency to the demands for Missouri River development and prompted Congress, with the
support of lower basin congressional representatives, to order the Army Corps of Engineers
to submit a plan to prevent future flooding.
The Corps responded with the Pick Plan,
named for its author, Colonel Lewis Pick, the
Army Corps of Engineers, Missouri River Division, Engineer Y
Under the Pick Plan, the Corps proposed
building dams at Garrison in North Dakota,
and Oahe (Pierre), Fort Randall (Lake Andes),
and Gavin's Point (Yankton) in South Dakota. 22 These four dams would fulfill lower
basin demands for flood control and navigation and provide incidental irrigation and
hydroelectric power benefits. 23 The "Comprehensive Report on Missouri River Development," an Army Corps of Engineers policy
paper, stated that for the Pick dams, "Exclusive power storage would not be provided but
power would be generated with water released
for navigation and sanitation purposes."24 The
Corps made it clear that upper basin demands
for irrigation water would be secondary to
lower basin demands for navigation.
The Pick Plan also called for the construction of low, re-regulating dams below the
big dams to eliminate destructive surges when
the big dams released large amounts of water.
Re-regulation prevented high water from eroding river banks, disrupting downstream navigation, and disturbing municipal water
supplies. According to the Army Corps of
Engineers "Comprehensive Report," these reregulating dams would "Be constructed a short
distance downstream of each major dam, sufficiently high to create poundage to permit
releases from the lower dam at a uniform
rate."25 Re-regulating dams were to be built
below the Garrison, Oahe, and Fort Randall
dams. The Army Corps of Engineers had not
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chosen a definite site for a re-regulating dam
below Garrison, but the re-regulating dam for
Fort Randall would be at Gavin's Point, near
Yankton, and for Oahe at the Big Bend of the
Missouri.
The Pick Plan split the Missouri River
States Committee along regional lines. Prior
to the plan's submission to Congress, the Army
Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation had maintained a functional working relationship. The Pick Plan's public
disclosure in February 1944 destroyed that
alliance and pitted the Reclamation Bureau
and its upper basin constituency against the
Corps and its lower basin supporters. MRSC
Chairperson Merrill Q. Sharpe favored the
Pick Plan because it was the first comprehensive dam building program for the Missouri River ever submitted to Congress. 26
Although the plan favored navigation interests over irrigation, Sharpe considered it the
best available and realized that South Dakota
would benefit substantially from its implementation.
Sharpe sought to gain the support of the
upper basin states for the Pick Plan. During
congressional hearings on 16-17 February
1944, Sharpe urged cooperation between the
various basin interests, presenting an insightful analysis of the problems and potentials of
river development. He noted that the conflict between the irrigation and navigation
interests was predicated on a perceived shortage of water and could be resolved through
the construction of dams that could hold back
enough water for both lower and upper basin
needs. As he summed it up, "I think a complete answer for many years to come is found
in the single word 'storage'." Sharpe concluded
by warning that if sufficient storage did not
solve the conflict, then the entire development plan would be threatened.
It seems to me that such a result [increasing
reservoir water storage capacity] should be
reached rather than letting any conflict of
interests bring the matter to an impasse
which will deprive the Missouri Valley and

the nation of the multiple benefits to labor, agriculture, business, postwar adjustment, and other national objectives which
require that the project get started now ... 27
Assurances of goodwill by the Army Corps
of Engineers and Sharpe to build more storage
into their Pick Plan were not enough to convince the Bureau of Reclamation and upper
basin irrigationists that their interests would
be satisfied. In May 1944 the Bureau of Reclamation responded with its own plan, which
emphasized irrigation and hydroelectric
power. This plan, known as the Sloan Plan
after its author, William G. Sloan, a Bureau
of Reclamation field agent stationed in Billings, Montana, called for the construction of
dams on the main-stem of the Missouri River
at Oahe (Pierre), Big Bend (30 miles north of
Chamberlain), and Fort Randall (Lake Andes).
The dams at Oahe and Fort Randall were to
provide the necessary water storage to irrigate
land in both North and South Dakota. The
bulk of the land Sloan hoped to irrigate was
located in eastern South Dakota in the James
River Valley. The hydroelectricity produced
by the three dams would pump stored water
for irrigation while surplus electricity could
be sold to recover the costs of the projects. 28
The submission of the Sloan Plan led Sharpe
on a frantic effort to mend the split between
the upper and lower basin states and between
the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army
Corps of Engineers in order to save a comprehensive, basin-wide development plan financed by the federal government. On
5 August 1944 Sharpe called the MRSC to
Omaha, Nebraska, where upper and lower basin interests recognized the folly of attempting to develop the Missouri River without
each other's cooperation. If the two factions
went their own separate ways, the development plan would be jeop~rdized by the resultant political and legal infighting. Congress
would not authorize the construction of two
programs in direct conflict with one another,
so the upper basin states and the Bureau of
Reclamation joined with the lower basin states
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and the Army Corps of Engineers to create a
revised river development plan that met the
needs of all interested groupS.29
At the Omaha meeting the MRSC passed a
resolution that satisfied the demands of upper
basin interests and made the Pick-Sloan compromise possible. Point five of the resolution
stated,
That authorization of the Bureau of Reclamation plan now before Congress ... is
necessary to a comprehensive development
of the Missouri River .... We ask the President and the Congress of the United States
to authorize and direct the United States
Army Engineers and the United States Bureau of Reclamation to bring before Congress a coordinated plan ... 30
The MRSC then distributed this resolution
throughout the executive and legislative
branches of the federal government. The success of the compromise was contingent upon
the site selection and design of multiple-purpose dams. The dams proposed by the Bureau
of Reclamation in the Sloan Plan and by the
Army Corps of Engineers in the Pick Plan were
designed almost exclusively for their particular constituencies. If the compromise were to
work and the off-reservation interest groups
of the entire basin were to avoid legal haggling over the river's water, the plans of the
Army Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation had to be altered, new dam sites chosen, each previously proposed dam redesigned,
and reservoir water storage capacities increased. Only these alterations would insure
continued congressional support for the development of the Missouri. All parties involved realized that disunity among the basin
states would threaten congressional appropriations for the projects. 3l
LOCATING THE DAMS

A number of hurdles had to be overcome
for the multiple-purpose dam concept to be
successful in the Missouri Valley. First, proper

sites had to be chosen for the construction of
the dams. Second, the dams and reservoirs
had to be designed in minute detail to insure
that basin interests received the promised benefits. And third, the weather had to cooperate
by producing enough rainfall to fill the reservoirs. The first two hurdles could be overcome
with the proper application of science and
technology, but no one controlled the weather,
and this worried everyone. If the rains did not
fall and drain into the Missouri Valley to be
stored behind the dams, the political compromise that had created the Pick-Sloan Plan
would crumble.
Site selection was dependent upon geology,
cost-effectiveness, demographics, and political considerations. The geological character
of the Missouri Valley limited the area of possible sites to the upper basin. From Fort Peck
Dam in Montana to Yankton, South Dakota,
the Missouri Valley is only one to five miles
wide, but below Yankton, the valley widens
dramatically, becoming an alluvial flood plain
five to seventeen miles across, through which
the river meanders great distances. Dams in
the lower valley would be exorbitantly expensive because they required great amounts of
earth fill, and they would be unsafe because
subsurface mineral deposits are less stable over
long stretches. Thus, the dam engineers focused their attention on the Missouri in North
and South Dakota where the valley is narrow
and relatively stable subsurface minerals exist. 32
The Missouri Valley in South Dakota is
underlain with deposits of Pierre shale and
Niobrara chalk. Engineers deemed both of
these subsurface minerals suitable for the
placement of large earth-fill dams, but the
depth of these minerals affected the cost of
the dams. Since the dams had to be attached
to the chalk or shale, digging down to deeper
deposits would be more costly.33 Another geological consideration was the relation of the
sites to tributaries of the Missouri River. The
dams needed to capture all, or most, of the
water entering the valley, because if a major
tributary's water were not captured its flood
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FIG. 3 . Portions of the original Indian community of Lower Brule. Courtesy of the Missouri River Division,
US Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska.

waters could wreak havoc on downstream urban centers and agricultural lands and possibly disrupt navigation. 34
Non-geological factors also affected the
cost-effectiveness of the dam sites. Engineers
had to consider the proximity of sites to available transportation facilities, since large pieces
of machinery and equipment would have to
be brought in by railroad and highway. For a
site distant from a railhead or highway, the
cost of constructing a road would have to be
added to the cost of the dam itself. 35
The dams also had to be close to towns,
housing, hospitals, and recreational facilities,
as construction personnel needed food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and some place to
spend their spare time. The Corps could not

afford to construct these facilities at the site,
so dams near cities or towns were preferable. 36
Engineers also considered the difficulty and
cost of acquiring the lands needed for dam
sites and reservoirs as well as the cost of relocating valley residents. Purchasing prime agriculturalland, or expensive urban real estate,
would have increased the overall cost of a
dam's constructionj therefore, "underutilized"
or cheap, "low quality" Indian land was preferable. 37 Furthermore, moving a large off-reservation urban population-and railroad
bridges, sewer facilities, buildings, and other
property-would cost far more than moving
residents of Indian reservations whose worldly
possessions and homes had less market value.
Since power was to be one of the products of
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FIG. 4. The relocated Indian community of Lower Brule, January 1964. The abandoned town can be seen in
the background. Courtesy of the Missouri River Division, US Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska.

the dam, transmission lines carrying the hydroelectric power from the site to the available market needed to be as short as possible.
The biggest influence on site selection for
the dams of Pick-Sloan, however, was the relation of the dams to off-reservation urban
centers in the Dakotas. Each dam and reservoir had to spare the large urban centers while
providing the reservoir storage capacity to
meet the water demands of basin interest
groups. The importance of the population
centers to the site selection process was explicitly stated in the 1944-45 "Comprehensive Report on Missouri River Development":
In determining the location of the multiplepurpose reservoirs, consideration must be

given to the existence of cities which might
be wholly or partially inundated by these
reservoirs, and the railroads and highways
crossing the river in the reservoir areas.
Larger cities in this category are Chamberlain, Pierre, and Mobridge in South Dakota, and Bismarck and Williston in North
Dakota. Accordingly, the sites described
in this report have been selected at such
distances downstream from these cities that
sufficient storage [in the reservoirs] will be
provided without undue flooding of expensive real estate . . . . Thus the height to
which Fort Randall Dam can be built is
limited by Chamberlain and the railroad
and highway crossings in that vicinity,
while the proximity of the city of Pierre,
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FIG. 5. Fort Randall Dam, c. 1950. In this photo, the embankment of the dam rises above the valley floor. After
massive Euclid dump trucks deposited earth on the surface of the embankment, bulldozers and rollers compacted the
material. The Corps of Engineers and the Missouri River States Committee limited the height of Fort Randall Dam
to prevent excessive water damage to the town of Chamberlain, but these organizations did not reduce the dam's
height to spare the Indian community of Fort Thompson, approximately 30 miles north, northwest of Chamberlain.
Courtesy of the Missouri River Division, US Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska.

S. Dakota, to the upper reaches of the Fort
Randall Reservoir precludes any further
consideration for dams below Pierre.
The report continued,
One of the reasons for selecting the Garrison site was that it is above Bismarck ....
The storage limit for Garrison reservoir was
dictated by damages imposed at and in the
vicinity of Williston, near the Montana
border.38

By October 1944 the Corps, the Bureau of
Reclamation, and the MRSC had come to an
agreement on the selection of dam sites on
the Missouri River. There were to be five
dams on the main-stem of the river. Four
dams, Oahe, Big Bend, Fort Randall, and
Gavin's Point, were to be built in South Dakota. The fifth, Garrison, was to be located in
North Dakota. Engineers and politicians chose
these dam sites because of their cost-effectiveness and topographical attributes. Most
importantly, the five dams of the Pick-Sloan
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FIG. 6. Fort Randall Dam and Lake Francis Case. c. 1965. The Corps of Engineers began storing water behind
Fort Randall Dam in November 1952. Within a few months. Fort Randall Reservoir stretched twenty-five miles
upstream. By the fall of 1954. the reservoir (later named in honor of South Dakota Senator Francis Case)
approached its maximum level. inundating vast tracks of valley bottomland on the Crow Creek and Lower Brule
Indian reservations. Courtesy of the Missouri River Division. US Army Corps of Engineers. Omaha. Nebraska.

Plan would minimize damage to off-reservation urban centers in the Dakotas while still
providing the reservoir storage capacity to satisfy off-reservation demands for flood control,
navigation, hydroelectricity, and irrigation.
SACRIFICING INDIAN LANDS

Indian lands and towns located along the
Missouri River in the Dakotas and Nebraska
did not receive the same degree of consideration in the site selection and design of Pick-

Sloan's dams that off-reservation cities received. The Corps, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the MRSC were unwilling to change
the sites of Pick-Sloan's dams or alter their
reservoir storage capacities to spare Indian
valley lands or towns. The reason was simpleany reduction in reservoir storage capacity to
take into consideration Indian interests would
mean a reduction in the cost-to-benefit ratio
of the project. An unfavorable cost-to-benefit ratio increased the likelihood that Congress would not fund the project. Moreover, if
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Indian interests in preserving their lands from
inundation, or in developing the Missouri
River for their own needs and wants, had been
considered by the MRSC, Corps, and Bureau
of Reclamation, off-reservation interests would
have received fewer benefits from the dam
projects and this in turn would have threatened the implementation of the Pick-Sloan
Plan. A reduction in benefits to off-reservation interests might have led to the withdrawal
of congressional support for the plan.
Excluded from the planning process, the
Indians of North and South Dakota discovered that much of their land had been sacrificed to the Pick-Sloan dams in order to make
the plan a reality. Without the reservoir water
storage provided by the Indian reservation bottomlands, the Pick-Sloan compromise would
not have been possible. Maximizing reservoir
water storage capacity was the key to the compromise and only Indian lands could provide
the water storage space. None of the planners
recognized that the bottom lands were of irreplaceable economic value to the Indians, who
could hunt and grow traditional crops on lands
that were "useless" only from the point of view
of technologically dependent commercial agriculture. Without the Indian bottomlands,
dams and reservoirs on the main-stem of the
Missouri would not have been as cost effective for non-reservation populations, which
in turn would have threatened their sources of
congressional funding. Engineering considerations were a factor in the site selection and
design of Pick-Sloan dams, but political considerations, especially a concern for maintaining the Pick-Sloan compromise and sparing
off-reservation urban centers, were the primary reasons the dams and reservoirs were
designed to be so high and built at locations so
disadvantageous to Indian interests.
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